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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
GUST PAPADOPULOS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
l\IARIO DEF ABRIZIO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appeal From _the Third District Court of Utah, 
for Salt Lake County 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
STATE~IENT 
Respondent has objected to parts of appellant ·s 
statement of facts, and he has made a statement of 
his version of the facts of the case. 
Appellant objects to respondent's statHment of 
facts, and to his arguments thereon, and, therEl-
f,ore, must request a compJete exa1nination of the 
Pntire record. 
:\ ppt:·llnnt re~p~ctfully .~ho"n.. that re~~)ondent '~ 
brief contains fallacies and artifir.(~f. lt st1··ings 
together some propositions that are indisputably 
trn~, and covertly a'3Rumes that other~ mingl~d with 
them, but not diRtinctly as~PrtPd. are also tr11e. lt 
~ l~o n~e~ the artifice of truthfully ~t~ting a. series 
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of faets, but suppresses one, or more, of the con-
trolling ones. 
Respondent has been misled by overlooking some 
facts whieh completely nullify the validity of his 
reasoning. He loses sight of important elements, 
and gets only a . partial view of the things he is in-
vestigating and discussing. His facts are made to 
fit a I theory or a hypothesis by suppressing nlate-
rial indisputable facts, and by, advancing mere con-
clusions. 
Respondent overlooks the stipulations and objec-
tions of counsel, and the rulings of the trial court, 
and findings Nos. 4 . and 5, and appellant's brief, 
page 27, quoted: 
''During the trial it was stipulated by 
eou.nse~, and then ruled by the trial judge, 
that said t'vo tenants could not try the 
titles of their landlords. The court said: 
'l\1r. Gray and the County might litiga.te 
that' - not the tenants. (B. E. 1()3; Tr. 
161). That 'Yas the right ruling.'' 
So, the trial court did not try the titles, and did not 
permit the tenants to try titles, and did not con-
vert an alleged trespass case between tenants into 
an action under R. S. U. 1933, gQ-10-35. And re-
spondent did not prove any ta~ sale, and he did not 
offer any certificate of tax sale aH provided in 
80-10-35~ R. S. U. 1933, or otherwise, or at all. 
There is no legal evidence to support any ta,x title . 
• A.ppellant stands on the record. 
:The seven sections of freP hold lands described in 
the pleadings and exhibits are held under patents 
of the U. S. A.~ which granted these lands ''to have 
and to hold with the appurtenaneer-; thereof unto 
the claimant and the heirs and assigns of the claim· 
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3 
ant forever.'' This freehold can be taken fro1n the 
patentee only by con.veyanc.e or descent. The ten-
, ure of lands does not depend upon the payment of 
taxes. Tax rolls are not evidence of legal title. Salt 
Lake County, 'vhich has released its tax liens, has 
never had even the semblance of legal seizin of a 
square foot of these lands. 'rhese lands have never 
been sold to discharge ta.:x liens. 
'rhe UtahSt1preme Court has stated that the treas-
urer's ''sale'' to the County is not a sale. The 
'treasurer's certificate operates to fix the date fron1 
which the tax lien bears interest. The legal situa-
tion is that the County had a legal lien and th.at the 
legal seizin oontinues to follow the record title. 
·The auditor's deed to the County at the maturity of 
the lien is not predicated on an unredee1ned ''sale'' 
and can therefore not operate as a conveyance of 
th£l freehold. The effect of the auditor's deed is 
to give to th€' County the power to sell its· tax lien 
at public May sale or at ~uhseqnent private sale, 
or a.lternativelv to sne to have the freehold sub-
iected to judicial sale a'R 13pecifically prescribed by 
the statutes. 
Here we have two tenants, commonly called Pappas 
and Defa, under written leases frorrJ the eommon 
landlords, L. H. Gray and Western Land Associa-
tion, "rho had the legal seizin and record title, on 
"~far~inal land, on the fringe of the wheat 
land, and on the fringe of grazing· land 
which C€nters around the "rater hole on 
Rertion 31 - both tenant~ in poRRessi on.'' 
Pnppa.R fl shepherd grazing his sheep, and Defa a 
fnrmer with an 
''Idea that he could extend the wheat belt 
""'est into the hills, and with this in n1ind 
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4 
.made a lease _with Gray 0\11 'April 6, 193b. 
When _.Pappas learned from Def_a that. Gray 
no. longer owned Section 31, Paprpas im-
mediately went to Salt Lake Uounty to 
secure a lease. Salt Lake County ._gave 
1->.appa.s a lease on 1\'la y 4, 1938, (and an 
option to purchase) on contig-uous sections, 
excluding Section 31. _Pappas acknowl-
edged his. landlord _Gray had no title to 
Section 31, and recognized Defa 's lease .with 
Salt Lake County for Section 31, and did 
in·no way interfere with D·efa's harvesting 
his crop under his lease with Salt Lake 
County for 1938. The harvest 'vaS' not com-
pleted until 1939. In reliance upon Gray's 
title which Defa had repudiated, Defa be-
gan to plow and plant Section 31 in 1940. 
It is the trespass of plowing up the fe,ed for 
Pappas's: flock with the loss of grazing and 
damage to his sheep (after May 20, 1940) 
of which the respondent complains.'' 
See respondent's brief, pp. 3 and 4, for the a.bove 
quotations. lJpon the foregoing statement Pappas 
claims the right to trespass and feed the crop of 
wheat planted by Defa. 
And upon the foreg1oing statement of facts re-
spondent no'v claims $250 for ''loss of lambs'-' be-
twe-en May 20th and June 7th, 1940. He quotes 
part of P'ara~graph 8 of the complaint (Resp. B-rief, 
page 17) and· suppresses the other· parts. The full 
par_agraph reads : 
''On or about April 25, 1940, plaintiff drove 
his 2000 hea.d of sheep on said property for 
the purpo·se of grazing, shearing and lamb-
ing said sheep, and plaintiff kept said 
sheep on said prop·erty until on or about 
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J nne 7, 1940, \\~hen plaintiff left \Yith one-
half of said sheep and their lambs, the re-
mainder of the she~ep being kept on said 
property until on or about June 15, 1940, 
\Yhen plaintiff took them a\ray." 
That is the only place in the complaint where re-
spondent mentioned ''lambs,'' and there he shows 
that "plaintiff left (the p·roperty) with the lambs 
on or about June 7, 1940." He does. not .allege the 
loss of any lambs at any time - and he did not lose 
any lambs. He sold said lambs the following Se~ 
tember for $4.85 as shown by his 10wn testimony in 
this case. ...~nd he \Yas in possession of said Sec-
tion 31 and the water springs thereon from April 
25th to June 15th, 1940, as shov\7Jl by his own 
pleauing and tes thnony in this case. 
All sheepmen know that \vith seven sections of 
grazing land, and 'vith but "one watering place," 
it is necessary for ewes to le~ave their lambs some 
eonsiderable distance in order to ohtain water, and 
that it is physically impossib~e to prevent ewes 
from losing their lambs. I__jaml1inga took place in 
April, and the trial court found: '' Tha.t on or aboui 
M~ay 20, 1940 to and including June 1, 1940, de-
fendant plowed a portion of the above described 
property'' after the lan1 bing season, ''thereby caus-
ing the loss of approximately fifty lambs'' but does 
~ot find thP 1'alue of said lam/bs. There is no find-
ing of fact to sustain said all e2:ed damages. 
Let's stop, look and listen. I .Jet's studv said par-
agraph 8 of the complaint just quoted. This is the 
gist of the pleading. This is the alleg-efl nossession 
Rnd rig-ht of possession upon which this a.ction for 
alleged trespass is prPdicated. This kind of pos-
RPssion \viii not support any action for alleg·ed tres-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
~pass. The complaint does not state facts sufficient 
to constitute a cause 10f action for alleg1ed trespass 
and injunction. The trial court erred in overruling 
the demurrer to the, complaint. The respondent 
p~ea.d himself out of c;ourt. A.nd by his statement 
he admits himself out of court. There .is no plead-
ing to support finding· No. 10 as to any damages 
'vhatever. Appellant objected· every time, and in 
ievery way, the law gave him the opportunity to do 
so. See appellant's brief. 
Note the possession plead and quoted. l'appas 
ar,gues he was not in possession in l:J38; and that he 
herded his sheep off in 1939; and that he did not 
molest D~efa 's possession in 1938 and 1939. But 
that on April 25, 1940, he dro;ve his sheep onto S'aid 
prloperty, and that he kept said sheep on said prop-
erty until June 15, 1940, when he took them away 
and surrendered the alleged possession to Defa __. 
and, of course, to his landlord, L. H. Gray. vvl1en 
he ·commenced this action in January., 1941, he had 
been out of possession about six months or more. 
He ple:ads, admits and argues that Defa "ras in pos-
. sessiton in 193H, 1939 and 1940 and farming said 
lands under his said leas-e of April 6, 193R nnller the 
common landlord, L. H. Gray. and that h~ herded 
off his sheep as therein providen. 
The crux of this case is: ''A crop believed to be 
.grain which crop is now .growing upon ~aid prop-
erty 'vhich crop renders the land useful for the pur-
poses of grazing'' as alleged in parag1raph 9-c of 
nlaintiff's verified complaint. That shows the 
. ~otives of, the plaintiff in commencing this action, 
and the afterthoug~t ~hout d4o:rpa.ge~ which he did 
not a1le~e and the frnd1n~s do.l\su~ta1n, and the law 
do-es not support. He is precluded and estopped 
by his acts. 
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Appellant asserts that the follo,ving· are 
INDISPUTABL:BJ F,ACTS 
1. 
On March 15, 1935, L. H. Gray and \\"r estern Land 
.A.ssociation were the owners, and in the sole pos-
session of the Barney (ianyon Ranch, containing 
approximately seven sections of land shown in Ex .. 
hibit No. 2 - a photostatic copy of the ID;a.p an .. 
nexed to the lease. On that day they leased and let 
said lands to Gust Pappas, this respondent, for a 
term of five years ending December 31, 1939, for 
grazing of sheep, and under this lease the respond-
ent went into possession of said lands, and paid 
rents to said landlords for the years 1936, 1936 and 
1937, and retained possession of said lands under 
said lease until December 31, 1939, as shown by the 
records and files in the transcript _·a,nd bill of ex-
ceptions. ,A copy of said lease is annexed to the 
complaint, but for some reason, perhaps Sec. 
104-2-14, it was suppressed hy respondent. 
The following is the copy annexed to the, complaint: 
EXHIBIT A 
This ag,reement of lease is entered into at 
Salt Lake City, Utah. the 15th . _day:; of 
l\farch, 1935, by and bet-\v-een L. H. Gray, 
agent lesRor and Gust Pappas lessee. 'VIT ... 
NESSETH: 
The leased prrmises is tl1e Barney Canyon 
Ranch in Salt Lake County, State of lTtah, 
containing approximately seven sectionR of 
lancl, a n1a.p of 'vhich i ~ attached. The 
leaRe iR for a. period of FIVE years un-
less sooner terminated by a ~ale of the 
r>roperty, anrl is for thc> g-razing; of sheep, 
lnmhinp: and Rhf\arin.!!·. Should a sa1r he 
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n1ade at lambing and shearing time such 
sale is. nort to interfere with lambing and 
shea.ring for that year. 
T4is lease hegins January 1, 1935 and ends 
on December 31, 1939. The lease price is 
$400.00 for the year 1935 and $500.00 each 
year thereafter, payabJ.e one-half at shear-
ing time and the other half at sale of lambs 
in the fall. This includes all my ranch 
above the track of B. & G. Ry. 
Failing to n1ake said payment~, the lease 
stands terminated 'vithout further notice. 
L. H. GRAY (signed). 
G·UST PAPPAA (signed). 
On Ap~ril 6, 1938' said L. H. Gray and Western 
Land Associ.ation leased and let to appellant, 
Marion Defa, for a term of six years, ending April 
6, 1944,. approximately 300 acres of said land, und~r 
a written crop lease, a copy of which lease was plead 
at length in the ans,ver and counterclaim, and re-
ceived in evidence as Exhibit 3, and quoted on pages 
18, 19 and 20 of appellant's hrief. No reply to this 
answer ~and counterclaim was filed. This lease 
provides: 
''This lease is not to interfere with the 
grazin~ lease to Gust Pappas for the spring 
of 1938. After thRt Rnita.ble arrangement 
isi to be made with Pappas to herd his she·ep 
off of the grain or \Vheat." 
That accounts for the more than remarkable state-
ment in respondent's brief at pp. 9 and 27: 
''Respondent took possession of Section 
31 in the spring of 1939 and protected appel-
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lant '~ cr.op by hiring t\vo extra sheep herd-
ers crl.. ·~ J, 7 5). '' 
'·'!'he evidence esta.bli -shes th.a.t respondent 
~, .. was. in possession in 193'9, placed extra 
men to protect the wheat, and pern1itted 
appellant to harvest his. crop without 
molestation (Tr. 73, 75, 112, 11B, 115, 158). '; 
. Of cour~e,. appellant ·and respondent were both in 
possession in 1939, as provjded in said leases, and 
as provided by Sec. 104-60-4, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933. That is indisputably true; and it is 
also indisputably true that both tenants were in 
possession on May 4, 1938; and that said landlords., 
L. H. Gray and Western I ..land Association, \vere, 
and now are, in possession, and they are the own-
ers of said lands ; and that said landlords O\Vn an 
undivided one-flourth of the crops of \Yhea.t gro,vn 
on said land; and that they directed the clearing, 
p}o,ving and planting thereof by this appellant, 
Defa; and that the respondent purposely sup-
pressed said facts when he prepared Finding of 
Pact No. 4. That is prejudicjal and reversible 
error. 
3. 
At all times mentioned said landlords. L. H. Gray 
and Western Land Association, were in possession 
of all of said lands under said two tenants and nn-
der said two written leases. ~The said landlords 
had, and n1ow have, legal rights to the rtntals pro-
\?ided in both of said leases. Neither of s.ai.d ten.: 
ants can legally question the possession, nor right 
of possession, :of s:aid landlords. The said land-
Jords are protected by, and both of said tenHnt~ ai·e 
subject to and barred by, the provi.Rions of 
104-2-14, Rev. Stat. of Utah, 1933, 
""l1irh reRdR ~ 
"104-2-14. - Possession of Tenant De·etn-
Prl Possession of Ijandl'Ord. - "W11en the rP-
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lation of landlord and tenant has existed 
bet\veen any persons, the posses8ion of the 
tenant is deemed the po·ssession of the land-
lord until the expiration of seven years 
t rom the termination of the tenancy, or, 
where there has been no written lease, un-
til the expiration of seven years from the 
tin1e of the last payment of rent, .notwith-
standing that such tenant may have ac. 
quired another title, or may have claimed · 
to hold adversely to his landlord; but such 
presumption eannot he made after the 
periods herein limited.'' 
In the case of 
Woodbury v. Bunker, 98 Utah, at Page 222, 
this Court said : 
''So long as- the tenant remains in posses-
sion, his possession is that of the landlord, 
and he cannot by words or acts, make hiR 
possession, or that of one whom he per-
nlits upon the premises, a possession ad-
verse to the landlord.'' 
That is the law of this State. That is the general 
rule and it is supported by the weight of autho·rity 
and sound legal reasoning. _ 
''The doctrine is not merely technical ·but 
is founded in public convenience and policy, 
because it tends to encourag~e honesty and 
2'0od faith between landlord and tenant, 
~nd is, undoubtedly, well root~d in sound 
morality." 
· 16 Ruling Case La.w, Par 137, Page 650. 
4. 
Neither the respondent nor the appellant secured 
any leg1al lease from Salt Lake County. Both 
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agreements of May 4, 1938, Exhibits No. 1 and H, 
recite: 
Salt Lake County ''hereby appoints the 
Second Party as agent for the l11rst Party 
for the sole and only p'ttrpose of guard-
ing, protecting and preserving the above 
described property fro 1n the 4th day o I 
1llay, A. D. 1938.'' 
This in legal effect appointed L. H. Gray, the land-
lord and legal S'eizin owner and holder of the record 
title, because the said tenants were then in posses-
sion under said L. H. Gray. Neither of the tenants 
paid anything to Salt Lake County for said agree-
ments, which are not leases 'ttnder the la1vs. 
5. 
Said agreement of }lay 4th, 1938, Exhibit H, pro-
vided: 
"Second Party (Gust Pappas) is hereby 
granted au option to p'tt'rchase said prop-
erty on tenns acceptable to First Party.'' 
.And that accounts for the alle,g1a.tion that '' Pa,p·pas 
immediately went to Salt Lake County'' to avoid 
payment of $500 rent for 1938 to L. H. Gray, and to 
purchase the tax lien and get a tax title on ~fay 4, 
1938, at the ~fay s·ale. This is shown by Exhibit Kl 
Bill of Exceptions, page 172. 
''The broad view is taken that a tenant can-
not become directly or indirectly a pur-
chaser at a tax s.ale and thereby acquire any 
title "Thich he may assert agninst his land-
lord. The remedy of the tenant is rather 
to discharge the assessment himself and 
deduct the amount fDom the rent. If the 
tenant was at the time indebted to the land-
lord for rent in the amo1int of taxes,· he 
' 
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should p.a~ such taxes, and he is precluded 
from purchasing or leasing for his sole 
benefit.'' 
Williams v. Morris, 95 U. S. 444; ~4 U. S. 
· (L.· Ed.) 360 .. 
Notes: 15 Am. Dec. 6,90; 89 ·A~ S .R. 84; 
.. 53 L. R. A. 940; 15 En~. Rul. Cas. 305. 
6. 
The appellant, Def~, secured the agreement of May 
4, 1938, Exhibit No. 1, for .Section 31, because he 
had half of· the said work done under said lease ·of 
April 6, 1938 fr10m said landlord, L. H. Gray. (Tr. 
64 to 68, and Appellant's Brief, p. 31). That agree-
ment was to protect hiin~elf and his landlord, L. H. 
Gray. And he completed the plowing and planting 
according to the said lease of April 6, 1938, and at 
all tirnes Defa has pHrforn1ed and kept his sB.id leilse 
with L. H. Gra.y, and nort aaverse t~o him. ·All of 
that testimony is in the hill of exceptions, and it has 
he en abstracted in appellant's brief, and it has not 
been denied, or explained otherwise. So it sta.nds 
as anot.her indisputable fact 
7. 
There was no eviction of any one at any time. 
Pappas had his camp and sheep on Section 31 on 
May 4, 1938. He did not move off until June 15, 
1938, and he us.ed parts of Section 31 every year 
from 1935 to and including June 15, 1940, notwith .. 
standing his lease expired on December 31, 1939, 
and notwithstanding the extended explanation .on 
p-age 11 of respondent's hrirf. That is the on1y 
watering place . on s·aid seven sections of land de-
;Scribed in said leases. A.nd, of course, it is un-
re.asonable to believe that Pappas did not water his 
sheep and us·e said ·Section 31 in April, May and 
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June of each year. All of the pleadings, exhibits, 
and testilnony sustain that fact, and there is no dis-
pute whatever. So that is another indisputable 
fact. 
B. 
Finally, the legal relationship of landlord and ten-
ant between Pappas and Gray did not te·rminate un-
til l)ecember 31, 1939. The lease bet,veen Defa and 
Gray does not terminate until April ti, 1944. The 
original landlord, L. H. Gray, and the tenant, Defa, 
,at all times after April 6, 1938 were and now are 
in the possession, and Pappas \Ya.s a trespasser after 
the expiration of his said lease 1on December 31, 
1939. 
CONCLUSION 
By his own pleadings and admissions in the record, 
the respondent has plead himself out of court. He 
:is precluded and estopped, and in good conscie·nce 
and equity, of right ou~ht to be precluded and 
estopped from maintaining this action against 
Defa. As a tenant of L. H. Gray, on l\fa.y 4, 1938, 
respondent had $500 rentals in his possession and 
was under le1glal duty to p·rotect the p·roperty and 
the possession for his landlord, L. H. Gray. .And 
.as an honest man, with clean hands in equity, he 
should have gone to his landlord, ,and not to the 
County, when he learned of the non-payment of 
taxes, and provided the money to pay such delin-
quent taxes from said rentals. And when he saw 
Defa plo,ving and planting wheat in 1938 to he har-
'"<'~ted in 19'39 he should have~ stopped him, or had 
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his land1ord stop him, and not stand by and see 
l)efa spend thousands of dollars clearing, plowing 
and planting said lands in 1938, and by hiring herd-
ers to keep his sheep off the wheat crop in 1939! 
Respondent is now in U. S. A., where, thank God, 
there are still laws and equity and courts to en-
force them. The judgment of the trial court denies 
the appellant due process of law which is guaran-
teed by the Constitution and laws of this State. 
The judgment ap·pealed from should be reversed 
'vith eosts. 
Respectfully submitted. 
C. E. NORTON, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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